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Artificial general intelligence (AGI) refers to research aimed at tackling the full problem
of artificial intelligence, that is, create truly intelligent agents. This sets it apart from most
AI research which aims at solving relatively narrow domains, such as character recognition,
motion planning, or increasing player satisfaction in games. But how do we know when an
agent is truly intelligent? A common point of reference in the AGI community is Legg and
Hutter’s formal definition of universal intelligence, which has the appeal of simplicity and
generality but is unfortunately incomputable.
Games of various kinds are commonly used as benchmarks for “narrow” AI research,
as they are considered to have many important properties. We argue that many of these
properties carry over to the testing of general intelligence as well. We then sketch how such
testing could practically be carried out. The central part of this sketch is an extension of
universal intelligence to deal with finite time, and the use of sampling of the space of games
expressed in a suitably biased game description language.
Keywords: measure of intelligence, games
1. Introduction
Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) is the bold endeavor of reaching beyond the narrow
focus of much of the current artificial intelligence research community, aiming to build
agents that encompass the whole breadth of human intellectual faculties and more. In
contrast to narrow AI, the focus of AGI research lies on the breadth of the range of
environments in which an agent behaves intelligently, rather than the performance in a
particular environment. Ultimately, that range should cover all environments that humans
can act in, and more.
While artificial intelligence originally had this broad vision (Schmidhuber (2007)), many
practitioners have taken to specializing on particular, more manageable subproblems. While
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this trend has greatly advanced the field and been highly successful for many practical
applications, many find it philosophically unsatisfactory. Not surprisingly therefore, the
pendulum has started to swing back, and there is a resurgent interest in the big questions
on how artificial general intelligence can come about. The recent development of a solid
theoretical framework for AGI by Hutter (2005) has played a major role in this rekindling.
Alongside this development there has been an increased effort toward designing an
objective and practical benchmark for measuring general intelligence, because it would allow
for a better comparability between the very diverse approaches to AGI and homogenize the
field. While the debate is slowly converging around the recently proposed formal measure of
universal intelligence by Legg and Hutter (2007), no truly general yet practical benchmark
has been established.
A general benchmark will necessarily need to evaluate an agent on a large set of
environments, and in order to form a single composite score, each environment must have
an associated weight. In the best case, the set of environments includes all well-defined,
practically evaluable environments. In practice, however, we will have to restrict this set,
thereby introducing a bias and making the benchmark less general. Concretely, this paper
proposes a benchmark limited to the subset of game environments. We will argue for this
particular choice, showing that it preserves a high level of generality, while at the same time
being practically useful.
We will start by introducing measures of general intelligence, how they can be altered
to include resource constraints and how they implicitly determine a weighting of the set of
environments (section 2). We then discuss the suitability of games as a class of environments
(section 3), before connecting the dots and defining a benchmark for measuring general game
intelligence (section 4). Finally, we tackle the issue of game description languages, and how
existing ones could be used (section 5).
2. Defining Intelligence
Intelligence is one of those interesting concepts that everyone has an opinion about, but
few people are able to give a definition for – and when they do, their definitions tend to
disagree with each other. And curiously, the consensus opinions change over time: consider
for example a number of indicators for human intelligence like arithmetic skills, memory
capacity, chess playing, theorem proving – all of which were commonly employed in the past,
but since machines now outperform humans on those tasks, they have fallen into disuse.
We refer the interested reader to a comprehensive treatment of the subject matter in Legg
(2008).
The current artificial intelligence literature features a panoply of benchmarks, many of
which, unfortunately, are very narrow, applicable only on a small class of tasks. This is
not to say that they cannot be useful for advancing the field, but in retrospect it often
becomes clear how little an advance on a narrow task contributed to the general field. For
example, researchers used to argue that serious progress on a game as complex as chess
would necessarily generate many insights, and the techniques employed in the solution
would be useful for real-world problems – well, no.
All this highlights the need for a very general definition that goes beyond an aggregation
of a handful of tasks. We now introduce the most general definition to date (section 2.1),
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which unfortunately is only of theoretical use, as the quantities it relies on are not
computable. In section 2.2 then, we delineate a more practical version that takes
computation time into account.
2.1 Universal Intelligence
Building upon Solomonoff’s theory of universal induction Solomonoff (1964), and extending
it to handle agents that act in their environment (in contrast to just passively pondering
upon observations), Hutter (2005) recently developed a formal framework for universal
artificial intelligence. Within the very general reinforcement learning setting, he formally
describes an optimal agent (called AIXI) that maximizes the expected reward for all possible
unknown environments – the only caveat being its incomputability.
As a dual of this framework, Legg and Hutter (2007) define a formal measure of universal
intelligence, for which AIXI, per definition, achieves the highest score. Interestingly, their
resulting definition coincides well with many informal, mainstream ones. Here we summarize
their results, as they will form the theoretical basis for much of this paper.
Intelligence measures an agent’s ability to achieve goals in a wide range of
environments.
Formally, the intelligence measure Υ of an agent pi in a class of (computable)





where Vµ(pi) is the expected total reward of pi when acting in a particular environment µ,
and K(µ) is a complexity measure of the environment (satisfying the technical condition∑
µ∈E 2
−K(µ) < ∞). We call Υ(pi) the universal intelligence of pi when E is the set of all
computable environments, and K(µ) is the Kolmogorov complexity of µ, i.e. the length of
the shortest program that fully describes µ.
Very informally, this equation can be read as “the universal intelligence of an agent is
the sum of how well it performs in all computable environments, logarithmically weighted
by their complexity so that simpler environments count more”. For a more intuitive
understanding, it may be useful to expand upon a number of aspects of this definition:
• Environments: We take the term environment to encompass not only the dynamics
that define what happens for each possible action (which might in turn include the
reaction of an adversary), but also the rules according to which the agent is rewarded.
• Goals: According to the most well-received theory of the development of life on earth
(Darwin’s), all living beings can be said to have a goal (maximization of evolutionary
fitness), but as this is not necessarily true, i.e. not true in all possible worlds, it is
debatable whether goals are an existential requirement for intelligence. While we do
not claim that intelligence in the broad sense cannot in part be purely ‘contemplative’,
we cannot conceive of how the intelligence of an agent that is devoid of any goal-
driven behavior could be measured. For practicality therefore, we assume that each
environment produces a numeric ‘reward’ value, and maximizing it is the goal of an
intelligent agent.
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• Acting in the environment: In order for intelligence to be measurable, an agent
must act, as only actions can be evaluated objectively, not its internal processes (like
awareness).
• Space of environments: The presented definition can be seen as an intelligence
measure, also if the set E is more restrictive, e.g. limited to a particular domain of
interest, tasks where humans excel, say. This is related to the notion of pragmatic
general intelligence by Goertzel (2010).
• Weighting by complexity: We need some way to assign relative importance to
different environments, which is done through a complexity measure K, traditionally
measured in bits1. All environments are computable, therefore can be concisely
represented as a shortest piece of code – the length of this code is the environment
complexity.
Legg and Hutter propose their definition as a basis for any test of artificial general
intelligence. Among the advantages they list are its wide range of applicability (from random
to super-human), its objectivity, its universality, and the fact that it is formally defined.
Unfortunately however, it suffers from two major limitations: a) Incomputability:
Universal intelligence is incomputable, because the Kolmogorov complexity is incomputable
for any environment (due to the halting problem). b) Unlimited resources: The authors
deliberately do not include any consideration of time or space resources in their definition.
This means that two agents that act identically in theory will be assigned the exact same
intelligence Υ, even if one of them requires infinitely more computational resources to choose
its action (i.e. would never get to do any action in practice) than the other.
There have been a number of attempts to overcome the limitations of AIXI.
1. We may replace Solomonoff’s incomputable prior by the Speed Prior (Schmidhuber
(2002)), which assigns high probability to quickly computable environments (instead
of those with the shortest descriptions / lowest Kolmogorov complexity favored by
Solomonoff’s prior). This yields a computable agent AIS which can predict expected
reward with arbitrary accuracy in finite time.
2. We may use a Go¨del Machine with a fixed limit of computational resources per action
(Schmidhuber (2003, 2009)).
3. We may use a Monte-Carlo approximation of AIXI (Veness et al. (2009)). This already
yielded promising practical results on an ad-hoc portfolio of simple maze-tasks and
games (including Tic-Tac-Toe and Pac-Man): the same AIXI-approximating agent
learned to act reasonably well in all of them.
While it is clearly a useful direction to derive practical, scaled-down variants of
uncomputable, universally optimal agents, here we are concerned with the dual case:
Rendering the definition practical. One way of doing this would be to rephrase the
definitions of Legg and Hutter in the context of the Speed Prior (Schmidhuber (2002))
1. Note that there is no way to avoid non-uniform weighting: There exists no uniform probability
distribution on the integers.
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instead of Solomonoff’s prior. In the next section, however, we will follow an even more
pragmatic approach: we will greatly limit the class of environments further such that each
member of the class is not only quickly computable, but also of obvious interest to a wide
community of people, namely, gamers.
2.2 Intelligence and Limited Time
Clearly, any practically useful measure of general intelligence (i.e. that yields a good result in
finite time) needs to take computation time of the agent and environment into account. Also,
we posit that all agents are computable, and all environments are episodic (i.e. finish after
a finite number of interactions). The episodic assumption should be rather uncontroversial,
as all known organisms have finite life spans, and it is unclear what it would mean to
behave well in a task that might never finish. The computability assumption is necessary
for anything running on standard computers.
Although other resources, like memory, may be of practical importance as well, in the
following we limit ourselves to only time. (Most of the arguments remain applicable to
other limited resources.)
The two aspects of computation time to consider are:
1. The time the environment requires to generate the next state/observation, after
each action. We propose to incorporate the expected time into the environment’s
complexity measure. A standard formulation for this would be the equivalent of
Levin complexity:
K(µ) = l(µ) + log(τ(µ)),
where l(µ) is the (not necessarily shortest) length of the description of the environment
µ and τ(µ) is the expected computation time of µ (for one episode)2. This corresponds
to a trade-off that weights length exponentially more heavily than time. Many other
trade-offs are possible (see e.g. Sun et al. (2010) for an extensive discussion).
2. The time the agent requires to decide upon an action. We propose to incorporate this
into the definition of intelligence itself.
There are two ways for integrating resource limitations into a general intelligence
measure: Either the agent has an unlimited budget of time, but its performance is somehow
weighted by the resources it consumes (see e.g. Goertzel (2010) for a simple variant of this),
or the agent has a limited budget, and the intelligence measure is based on the (cumulative or
average) reward it can achieve within that limit (e.g. Hernandez-Orallo (2010); Schmidhuber
(2009)). The first of these is seriously flawed, as it can be exploited by ‘hyperactive’ agents,
2. Usually, and for asynchronous environments in particular, τ (µ) is an unproblematic value to define, it
could even be set to the total time budget T , see below. In some cases however, the computation time
of the environment may depend on the agent’s actions (e.g. updating a physical simulation when an
agent jumps into a liquid should take longer to compute than if the agent stands still). We sidestep this
issue by taking τ (µ) with respect to a randomly acting agent. This may be reasonable however, because
as the inherent complexity of the environment increases, the actions of the agent arguably account for
a relatively smaller variation in τ (µ) (which in turn contributes relatively less to K(µ)), thus becoming
irrelevant in the limit.
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that act extremely fast and randomly, with the effect of multiplying the low reward by a
large number.
In addition, resource consumption can be handled through the reward function, e.g. if
there is an implicit assumption that if completing an episode faster is valued more, then
this can be reflected in the rewards directly.
2.3 Two-phase Evaluation
Given an environment µ and a total time budget T 3 for the agent, we propose to set up the
measurement as follows. The time is split into a learning phase and an evaluation phase, and
the agent chooses itself when to (irreversibly) switch to the latter. Rewards gained during
the learning phase are disregarded, and the environment is reset at that point (otherwise an
agent could exploit by switching just before a predicted success, and stop afterward). The
final reward Vµ,T (µ) is the average reward of the completed episodes during the evaluation
phase (we need to take the average instead of the sum, here again, to handle ‘hyperactive’
agents), the accumulated reward so far if no episode was completed, or zero if the agent
never switched.
The motivation for having two phases is the issue of learning. Given that a task is
potentially attempted more than once, it is debatable whether the average performance is
what defines intelligence, or instead the capability to improve between early trials and later
ones. Applying the latter naively is prone to exploitation: That agent would be judged most
intelligent which can best hide its true skill in the first episodes (deliberately acting as bad as
possible) while acting normally in the end. Requiring the agent to switch itself removes this
moral hazard. On the other hand, using average performance over all attempts is a relatively
harsh setting for the exploration-exploitation trade-off, which may force the agent to act
overly carefully, not learning enough about the environment, and therefore leading to an
underestimation of its intelligence, a problem alleviated by the learning phase. Importantly,
this setup allows us to compare the intelligence of very different types of agents, all on the
same scale: a reasoning-based agent (that does not learn) can use all available resources
for that, skipping the learning phase, while an evolution-based agent could employ most
of those resources to evolve a good policy during many quick episodes and have itself be
evaluated on the best one encountered. In between those extremes, a good reinforcement
learning agent could handle the exploration-exploitation trade-off explicitly, including the
switching action.
Interactions could be synchronous (i.e. the environment is paused until the agent chooses
an action), but should preferably be asynchronous (‘pass’ actions until the agent has made a
decision), as it entails a more natural and environment-specific penalisation of slowly acting
agents.
2.4 Anytime-measure
In the best case, a practical intelligence measure should be an ‘anytime’-measure, i.e. that
can be stopped anytime, and gives more accurate results the longer it runs. A simple but
effective way to achieve this is to use a Monte-Carlo estimate of Υ, sampling more and more
3. As far as possible, the time units should be invariant with respect to hardware of implementation details,
e.g. it could be the number of CPU instructions executed.
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environments (that form a set Eˆ), where the probability of µ being sampled is proportional







Note that this assumes that the time limit T is specified within the environment
description itself, and thereby incorporated in the task complexity (larger total budgets
corresponding to more complex environments). If T is not part of the complexity, the
following iterative scheme can be shown to be an equivalent alternative. Start with T = T0,
i = 0. In each iteration i, evaluate 2i environments, half of which for T = 20T0, a quarter
for T = 21T0, and so forth, and one for T = 2
iT0.
To summarize, we adapted the definition of universal intelligence in three places to make
it practically useful:
1. We replaced Kolmogorov complexity with a computable complexity measure that
penalizes heavy computational requirements for the environments,
2. we incorporated resource usage into the performance measure of an agent to favor
efficient ones while avoiding some well-known pitfalls,
3. we formalized a Monte-Carlo approximation that can handle the infinite set of
environments, while at the same time forming an anytime-measure.
The next sections will add the final missing piece, namely a suitably biased domain of
environments, which are at once meaningful, easy to evaluate and easy to sample from:
Games.
3. Games as Testbeds
Games and artificial intelligence have close and long-standing ties to each other. Turing
himself, who proposed the first test for machine intelligence, also invented the MiniMax
algorithm for perfect information two-player games, and considered chess an important
domain for future computer science research (Turing (1950)). What is arguably the world’s
first reinforcement learning algorithm (a precursor to modern temporal difference learning)
was invented by Samuel in the context of building an automatic checkers playing program,
thus kickstarting a major strand of modern AI research.
More recently, several high-profile AI researchers have proposed games as good
benchmarks for AI (Laird and van Lent (2001); Masum and Christensen (2003)). At least
part of the argument is that the technical development of modern computer games
has now definitely overtaken custom-built benchmarks and robot simulators, and the
commercial game industry provides a huge amount of high-quality, well-tuned problems
and environments for AI research as a side effect of the commercial pressure for better
games.
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3.1 What are games?
There is not one definition of what a game is, but plenty. In fact, Wittgenstein used
the concept of a game in a number of thought-experiments designed to show that it was
impossible to correctly define any concept in terms of sufficient and necessary conditions;
instead, concepts are implicitly defined by those things that they refer to, and which are
related to each other through family likeness. Learning to use a concept is learning to
play the language-game that the concept forms part of, yet another example of a game
(Wittgenstein (1953)).
The impossibility of defining a naturally occurring concept does not mean you should not
try; a working definition of games would be great, even if we acknowledge that it’s not all-
encompassing. Game designer Sid Meier defines a game as “a series of meaningful choices”.
Others, such as Salen and Zimmerman (2004), emphasize conflicts as central to games: A
game is “a system in which players engage in an artificial conflict, defined by rules, that
results in a quantifiable outcome”. Juul (2005) provides a more formal definition: “A game
is a rule-based formal system with a variable and quantifiable outcome, where different
outcomes are assigned different values, the player exerts effort in order to influence the
outcome, the player feels attached to the outcome, and the consequences of the activity are
optional and negotiable”.
The above definitions are not without their critics. For example, game designer Raph
Koster remarks that none of them contain the word “fun” (Koster (2005)). As fun seems to
be so central to games, he then devotes a whole book to understanding what makes games
fun.
For our purposes, a more relevant criticism of the above definitions is that they refer
to a “player” who can “exert effort” and “engage” in “meaningful choices”. Obviously,
including such a player in a definition of a game which is used to test artificial intelligence
would beg the question of artificial intelligence as a whole. We therefore choose to adapt
Juul’s definition to fit our purposes:
A game is a rule-based formal system with a variable and quantifiable outcome,
where different outcomes are assigned different values, and an agent can
affect the outcome through taking actions during the game based on full or
partial knowledge of the game state.
3.2 Types of Games
There are countless types of games, and more different taxonomies of games than we can
do justice to here. Even if we restrict ourselves to games that can be played on a computer
(which excludes football, but not football simulations) there are numerous genres, which are
sometimes so different that it’s remarkable that the same word is used to all of them: card
games, board games, mathematical games, first-person shooter games, real-time strategy
games, flight simulator games, quiz games, role-playing games, puzzle games, rhythm games,
virtual world games and so on. Instead of attempting another taxonomy, we can draw up
a few dimensions along which games can vary, together with short comments on how the
requirements on the agent vary with these dimensions:
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• Observability: Perfect information games like chess allow the agent to see the whole
game state at any time, whereas a game with very low observability like Battleships
starts with the agent in complete darkness and drip-feeds of information about the
game state. A perfect information game can be played by a reactive agent, whereas
a game with low observability requires the agent to make hypotheses about the game
state and remember past information.
• Input dimensionality and representation: The agent’s knowledge of the state
space in Poker can be represented as a short sequence of integers representing the
cards at hand, whereas the high-resolution 3-dimensional image which constitutes an
observation in Halo requires several megabytes of data to represent accurately. The
latter representation requires the agent to perform sophisticated processing of visual
input, something which some researchers consider an integral part of intelligence (e.g.
many researchers in the adaptive behaviour community claim that it’s meaningless to
study intelligence except when grounded in a complete sensorymotor loop) and other
researchers consider a peripheral distraction.
• Single-, duo- or multiplayer: Single-player games are those where you only play
against the game itself, but many games have two or more players; some have many
millions of players (e.g. Farmville or World of Warcraft). The extent to which the
players compete directly against each other varies from those games where only one
player can win, to those where players mostly collaborate. The presence of other
players in the game will usually require the agent to model and predict the other
players’ actions in order to do well in the game.
3.3 Arguments for Games as AI Testbeds
So why would games be better as testbeds for AI than other problems, say, theorem proving,
image recognition, robot navigation or natural language interaction? A large number of
arguments have been put forward, some of which only apply to some types of games and
some aspects of intelligence, others which are more general.
• Simplicity: Many games can be concisely described using unambiguous mathematical
notation, and have surprising depth despite their apparently bare-bone dynamics. A
good example of this is the ancient board game Go, which offers enormous depth
despite the rules being so simple they can be written in a few lines.
• Natural reward function: Games are typically constructed so that they have a very
natural reward function: the score. Score-based reward functions are often smooth
and fine-grained, as many different actions and events are scored. This means that the
player’s proficiency can be accurately quantitatively measured for both high-skilled
and low-skilled players.
• Scalability: Most games are made to be played by humans, and to be learned by
humans while playing. This means that they typically possess a human-friendly long
and smooth learning curve, ideal for reinforcement learning. Agents of very low skill
can make some progress (better than agents of no skill) while agents of higher skill
can reach much higher performance.
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• Proven performance and remaining challenge: Games is a domain where on some
instances (chess, checkers, backgammon, etc.) computers have already reached or
surpassed human-level performance, suggesting that AI approaches can learn to beat
humans at other games. At the same time, there remain considerable challenges, as
computer programs are nowhere near competitive with the best players of e.g. Go or
StarCraft.
• Understandability: Playing games is an activity humans understand, making it easy
to understand what the agent is doing and how well it is doing it. We can also judge
the performance of an agent by playing directly against it.
• Fun: People like games, both playing, watching and talking about them. This goes for
researchers, students and ordinary people. Therefore, it’s often easier to find students
for game-related research than for other topics.
• Public awareness: Most people know what games are about, unlike more abstract tasks
(like theorem-proving), which makes it easier to explain what a research breakthrough
is about.
• Industrial applicability: There’s money in games, as the game industry is already the
largest of the entertainment industries, and keeps growing. Games and virtual worlds
are more and more used for training, planning and education purposes. Therefore,
it can be easier to get funding for game-related research than for research on AI
applications in other domains.
• Availability and cost: Game developers and hobbyists have made implementations
of all types of games widely available, either for free or for a very modest sum.
Some games come with extensive interfaces for interfacing AI in various roles and
for modifying the games in various ways (e.g. Civilization IV and Unreal Tournament
2004). For some older games (e.g. Quake) and many hobbyist-developed games the
source code is freely available.
• Speed: Most games are relatively quick to play even when played in “real-time”. Many
video games can be sped up to be played thousands of times faster than real-time on
current hardware; e.g. the current Mario AI Competition uses a version of Super
Mario Bros where a couple of hundred games can be played per second. Board games
and mathematical games have no “real-time”, and the simplicity of evaluating the
game mechanics means that millions of games can be played per second and virtually
the only limiting factor is the computational complexity of the player.
• Diversity: As noted above, there are innumerable genres of games; arguably, there
exist games related to virtually every human cognitive task. For example, many
games require cognitive skills such as visual and auditory perception, communication,
cooperation and competition, planning and reasoning, navigation and mapping, or
prediction and model-building.
Note that the most commonly touted classes of benchmark problems/environments fall
far short of games on several of the dimensions outline above. For example:
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• Physical robotics: simplicity, natural reward function, scalability, proven performance,
availability and cost, speed, diversity.
• Simulated robotics: simplicity, natural reward function, scalability, proven perfor-
mance, public awareness, diversity.
• Theorem proving: scalability, proven performance, understandability, fun, public
awareness, industrial applicability, diversity.
• Natural language understanding/production: simplicity, natural reward function,
understandability, fun, public awareness, availability and cost (of data), diversity.
• The original Turing test: scalability, proven performance, availability and cost (of test
participants), speed, diversity.
3.4 Competitions
Game challenges for artificial intelligence are often posed in the form of competitions.
The world’s probably most famous AI event was a games-based competition: the match
between former chess world champion Garry Kasparov and the IBM Deep Blue integrated
software/hardware. The victory of machine over flesh in this competition prompted an
uncommon but vigorous and certainly welcome public discussion about the nature of
intelligence and whether if could be embedded in a machine. A near-consensus among
commentators was that because this seemingly very complicated problem (playing chess)
could be solved with just a simple search algorithm and a massive database, it was clearly
not necessary to be intelligent in order to be able to play chess. (This is an example of
the phenomenon of the ever-moving goalpost for AI: as soon as AI techniques are shown to
solve a problem, the problem is deemed not requiring intelligence, and its solution becomes
“mere computer science”.)
Since then, game AI competitions have diversified significantly. A number of games-
based AI competitions are currently running and enjoying healthy numbers of submis-
sions from academic AI researchers with various specialties. In particular, the IEEE
computational intelligence society sponsors a number of competitions associated with its
Congress on Evolutionary Computation and Conference on Computational Intelligence and
Games. These competitions are based on submitting agents that play particular games
well; the very diverse collection of games used includes Othello, Go, Pac-Man, Super
Mario Bros, Unreal Tournament and a car racing game (Loiacono et al. (2008, 2010);
Togelius, Karakovskiy, and Baumgarten (2010); Togelius et al. (2008); Hingston (2009)).
The point of these competitions is to focus researchers’ efforts on a single problem, which
has not been crafted in order to favour a particular algorithm, resulting in a reasonably fair
and reliable comparison of competing AI algorithms.
One competition we will find reason to return to in more depth later on is the Stanford
General Game Playing Competition, which differs from the above competitions in that
agents are judged not on their ability to play a single game, but a number of unseen games.
These games are described in a Game Description Language, which will be discussed further
in section 5.
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4. General Game Intelligence
Motivated by sections 3.3 and 3.4, we now proceed combine the practical measure of
intelligence from section 2.2 with a space of environments that is restricted to games, leading
us to a practical measure of general game intelligence. In particular, we put the following
restrictions on the set of environments:
• The total number of interactions is guaranteed to be finite (all games end eventually).
• The sum of rewards achievable in an episode (i.e. the game-score) is bounded.
• The agent-environment interface is simple: the environment sends a string of symbols
as observation, and the agent sends back a string of symbols as its action.
• Each game is encoded in a game description language (see section 5 for details), and
the length of this encoding, together with the computational resources required to
run the game define its complexity K (as described in section 2.2). The assumption
is that short encodings correspond to simpler games.
• When the game allows for a fixed adversary (e.g. Deep Blue), the encoding length
of the adversary, as well as its computation time, get incorporated in the complexity
measure of the game, as if they were part of the environment. This automatically
makes games with stronger opponents more complex, and adjusts their weight in the
total intelligence measure accordingly.
We distinguish two classes of game environments: Those that interface to a single agent,
for which we then define an absolute measure of general game intelligence, and those with
a higher number of players (typically 2) for which we similarly define a relative measure.
This relative measure of general game intelligence can then be used to establish a ladder
system or a unique ranking of all participating agents (e.g. Elo). This may give a richer
description of the capabilities of an agent than the single number generated by the absolute
measure, but is not quite as objective.
5. Game Description Languages
A game description language (GDL) is a language in which games can be described. More
formally, each GDL is accompanied by an interpreter which transforms GDL strings into
games, and a valid GDL string is one which can be transformed into a game by this
interpreter.
One could argue that any programming language constitutes a game description
language, as would a universal Turing machine. However, a game in the sense we consider
it here needs to have specified channels for input, output and reward signals, which is not
true of programs in general. If we arbitrarily assign these channels to e.g. parts of memory
or positions on the program tape, infinitesimally few of all valid programs would also be
games in any meaningful sense.
Existing GDLs are much more limited in what they can express, in that they are not
Turing-complete, and cannot even express all possible games. Even within the space of
games which they can express, they are biased towards particular types of games (sampling
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all valid strings of a particular length will yield some types of games more often than others).
The following are some existing game design languages:
• The Stanford GDL is the language used in the Stanford General Game Playing
Competition (Love et al. (2008)). This language is based on defining objects, actions
and relations (representing legality of moves, effects etc.), and could in principle define
a very large number of different games, though it is biased towards board games. It
is limited to perfect information games with a discrete and finite state space, though
it is claimed that it could be extended to imperfect information games. As a result of
being so low-level, the Stanford GDL is not particularly compact, even when defining
the type of games which it is biased towards; the example definition of Tic-Tac-Toe
runs to two pages.
• The Ludi language was invented by Browne and Maire and used in their work on
automatically generating games using evolutionary algorithms (Browne and Maire
(2009)). This language is restricted to “recombination games” (essentially a subset of
board games) and is structured into a tree form, similar to LISP. Each branch of the
tree is a Ludeme which describes a particular aspect of the game, such as the shape of
the board or number of units. Due to being more specialized it is often quite compact,
e.g. Tic-Tac-Toe can be defined in six lines.
• Another GDL with a more narrow domain is the language used by Togelius and Schmidhuber
(2008) in their experiment on evolving Pac-Man-like games. This language only admits
fixed-length strings, where each string position has a particular meaning, e.g. the
number of entities (or “things”) of a particular colour, the movement logic of some
entity, and what happens when a particular type of entity collides with another. The
language is limited to predator-prey-like games in a discrete space of a given size.
What, then, would be desirable properties of a GDL used for testing for artificial general
intelligence? The following are some (potentially conflicting) suggestions:
• Expressiveness: The language should be able to express a large variety of different
games, in order to test as many aspects of general intelligence as possible. It is
desirable that the GDL should be able to express finite state as well as continuous state
games, large as well as small inputs spaces, single-player games as well as multi-player
games, perfect information games as well as partial information games, deterministic
games as well as those with noisy state transitions, etc.
• Compactness: The representation of any particular game should be as short as
possible. This also entails a language that is easy to sample from: many random
strings will be valid games.
• Meaningfulness: As high a fraction as possible of possible games should neither be
trivial nor impossible, but have a significant skill differentiation in their outcome.
It is worth noting that there are likely to be partial conflicts between these properties,
so that e.g. more compact games would likely be less expressive; however, clever design
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efforts will probably be able to find languages that satisfy all properties to a reasonable
degree.
It is also worth noting that it is perfectly possible to devise languages which describe
games with much more complex state spaces and input/output representations than the
type of games described by current GDLs. There is no restriction on the complexity of the
interpreter which generates games from descriptions; complete game engines, such as Unity
or the Unreal engine could be included along with component artwork. This would allow
the description of e.g. first-person shooter games and real-time strategy games.
6. AGI and Game Competitions
If intelligence tests along these lines are to be realized, one natural way to do it (especially
for determining relative measures of general intelligence) would be in the form of public
competitions. As discussed above, a number of competitions are currently ongoing (and
many more have run in the past) where AI techniques are tested using games of various
types. However, with the exception of the Stanford General Game Playing Competition,
they are all measuring performance on a single benchmark only. The Stanford competition
has met with rather limited participation, and is very different in setup from the ideas
proposed here in several ways – most importantly, the agents are given a complete
description of the environment, favoring reasoning over learning approaches.
It is important to state that we are not advocating an immediate transition to a unique
intelligence test and a single competition based on it. Rather, the ideas in this paper could
form the basis for a number of separate competitions, possibly based on already existing
competitions. These competitions would be based on different GDLs, that are more or less
strongly biased towards particular types of games.
One way to achieve a smooth transition from a game-specific competition to a more
general competition could be to take an existing benchmark game, and break it down into
a number of components and parameters, which can be used to build a game description
language. This GDL could then describe the original game, subsets of the original game
and variations of it. For example, one of the currently ongoing competitions is about
constructing an AI controller that plays Super Mario Bros4. This classic game could maybe
be decomposed into “ludemes” describing e.g. what happens when Mario runs into enemies
of various types, rules determining behavior of the various NPCs, effects that power-ups
have, the physics of the game, movement capabilities of Mario, sizes and topologies of levels,
rules about scoring, winning and losing, etc. This would allow the expression of a number
of games being somewhat similar to Mario, but differing greatly in game mechanics to be
expressed in a language that could be sampled according to the ideas expressed in this
paper.
7. Objections
In this section, we gather a few conceivable objections to the central proposition in this
paper, along with our responses to these objections.
4. http://www.marioai.org, Togelius, Karakovskiy, and Baumgarten (2010)
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• “This test will have enormous computational requirements. Playing many episodes of
so many different games is just not feasible.”
Measuring the performance on all possible games is certainly impossible. But our test
is a sample-based anytime measure, meaning that the more time we have, the more
games we can test on and therefore the more accurate our measure becomes. If we
have extremely limited time and/or computer power available we can test an agent
on only a handful games. If we want to compare the intelligence of two agents in very
limited time, however, it is important that we test them on the same games in order to
counteract the effects of having chosen this particular subset of games. Limiting the
evaluation time may however bias the test toward particular aspects of intelligence,
e.g. when it is too short for learning to be effective.
• “Most games drawn at random will be meaningless, and winning or losing them will
not be indicative of any interesting form of intelligence.”
This partly depends on the game description language chosen; some GDLs produce a
higher proportion of languages with good skill differentiation than others. But even if
a large majority of sampled games are trivial or impossible, or only test very narrow
abilities, this will not bias the test significantly. All agents will fail on the impossible
games, and all agents of minimal intelligence will learn to solve the trivial or narrow
games. Therefore, the ranking of various agents will be decided by their performance
on the more interesting games. At most, the results of the test may be renormalized
w.r.t. the proportion of trivial and impossible games, for readability. It might also
be possible to automatically pre-test the games for basic playability and learnability
before using them as part of the test.
• “Is is not counter-intuitive to assign higher weight to simple environments, which
presumably require less intelligence to tackle?” The reason behind this is two-fold.
First, there are many more complex games than simple ones, so taken together, the
weight of the complex ones is substantial. Second, this helps avoid over-specialization,
as each general agent is required to handle most simple environments – also intuitively,
we can question the general intelligence of the cliche` math genius who is unable to tie
his shoes. And as stated above, if any game is so easy that all agents can play it, the
difference between the agents will be decided by the more difficult games.
Note that a short description does not necessarily imply a simple environment:
complexity can emerge from simple rules (e.g. fractals, the game of Go).
• “Your test will only measure very narrow aspects of intelligence, e.g. combinatorial
reasoning. You completely miss out on the most important aspects of intelligence,
namely (insert property here).”
There is some substance to this objection, depending on the game description language
chosen. If the GDL is only capable of describing games within a rather narrow domain,
the skills needed to win at games within this domain will of course be more thoroughly
tested. However, note that even games with very simple mechanics appear to require
sophisticated skills; cf. the difficulties faced by AI researchers in building bots that
outperform humans in both Go and Poker. Bear in mind that these seem to be
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very different problems requiring different approaches: An agent that could play both
games (which could certainly be represented by the same GDL) at high level would
arguably be more generally intelligent than anything we have now.
For more on how about this sort of test measures supposedly human capacities like
intuition and creativity, see the extensive discussion in the original paper on universal
intelligence (Legg and Hutter (2007)); the basic argument is that to the extent these
capabilities help the agent solve the problem, they are implicitly tested.
• “Your test is completely disembodied. But intelligence is a property of an embodied
agent situated in an environment, grounding its symbols in direct interaction with the
environment through sensors and actuators.”
Whether embodiment is necessary is a debated topic, with differing views among
researchers and philosophers from different camps. If we restrict the GDL to
combinatorial or similar games, we are certainly leaving embodiment out. But to
the extent that an agent can be said to be embodied in a virtual world, embodiment
can be accommodated within this framework by simply including a 3D game engine
in the GDL interpreter. This would make it possible to describe games taking place
in rich 3D environments, forcing the agent to interpret high-dimensional visual input
and map its own movements between body-space and world-space.
• “You’re not saying anything new. This is all implicit in the Stanford General Game
Playing Competition.”
There is, somewhat surprisingly, very little theoretical justification to be found for
the Stanford GGP, at least in published form. In this paper, we lay out a theoretical
framework for that competition and similar competitions, and connect it to a well-
known theoretical contribution from the AGI community. We also discuss the severe
limitations of the GDL used in that competition, and propose a principled way of
sampling which games to play. Finally, a crucial difference between the Stanford GGP
and the test we are proposing is that the Stanford GGP provides agents with the GDL
specification of the game they are playing (arguably making the competition more
about parsing and internal simulation than learning based on experience) whereas
we propose to let the agents explore the game by interacting with it, which is more
general.
• “You’re not saying anything new. This is all implicit in Legg and Hutter’s definition
of universal intelligence.”
Universal intelligence is incomputable and does not take finite resources into account;
it is expressly meant to be approximated, as a basis for more practical tests (a call
which this paper is answering). The handling of finite resources through the agent
managing a time budget and deciding when to switch between training and evaluation
phases is new, as far as we know, as is the idea to sample the space of a GDL based
on description length.
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8. Conclusions
This paper we discussed why games should – and how they can – be used for research in
Artificial General Intelligence. We note that games are in many ways ideal for AI research,
but that current research which focuses on testing algorithms on particular games fails to
test for general intelligence: A general AI agent instead needs to be tested on an appropriate,
broad selection of unseen games.
To this effect, we have derived a practical measure of general game intelligence from
the Legg-Hutter definition of universal intelligence which elegantly incorporates the usage
of computational resources of both the agent and the game engine, in addition of being an
easily approximable anytime-measure. The central idea then is to use length- and resource-
weighted sampling of strings from a game description language and evaluate the agent on
the corresponding games. As game description languages are inherently limited and biased,
we discussed some existing GDLs, desirable properties of GDLs for AGI testing, and how
existing competitions could be turned into more general competitions.
We hope that this paper can spark and sustain interest into addressing the general
AI problem directly within the Game AI and Computational Intelligence and Games
communities, and in developing new challenging game-based AI competitions.
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